I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts explicitly distinguish between mutable and immutable traits -or status and conduct -when deciding most Title VII 1 cases. In doing so, the courts have routinely held that mutable traits are not entitled to protection under Title VII, and plaintiffs seldom win in these cases. 2 For example, plaintiffs regularly lose in cases where an employer's dress or grooming codes are challenged under Title VII's prohibition on race 3 or sex 4 discrimination. 5 Similarly, courts have held that -English-only‖ rules do not violate Title VII's prohibition on national origin discrimination since they simply prohibit speaking a particular language and do not discriminate based on an employee's national origin. 6 Employees also regularly lose in sex discrimination cases involving transsexualism 7 and sexual orientation 8 because courts have held that these plaintiffs are not being discriminated against based on the immutable characteristic of sex, but rather based on a choice made by the employee.
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Commentators have criticized this mutable/immutable distinction, 10 arguing that some mutable traits should also be entitled to Title VII protection and additionally, that some traits which courts have determined are mutable have immutable characteristics as well. 11 Yet despite these critiques, courts continue to routinely hold that certain characteristics -such as dress, grooming and language -are mutable and therefore not entitled to Title VII protection against discrimination based on race, sex or national origin. 12 Religion is, however, treated uniquely under Title VII and courts do not explicitly rely on the mutable/immutable distinction when deciding the religion cases. Title VII, as originally passed, did treat religion the same as race, color, sex, or national origin and prohibited discrimination based on religious beliefs (or status) 13 but did not specifically require accommodation of religious conduct. However, in 1972, Congress amended Title VII and enacted § 701(j) which specifically includes an affirmative duty of religious accommodation.
14 As a result, Congress clearly indicated that religious conduct, as well as religious status (belief), is entitled to protection under Title VII. 15 In other words, religious conduct is protected by Title VII, regardless of whether it is a mutable or immutable trait. (explaining how hair has immutable -as well as mutable -characteristics). 12 See generally Bayer, supra note 2; Engle, supra note 2; Farrell, supra note 2; Gonzalez, supra note 2. 13 Yet, a careful reading of the case law illustrates that many courts have continued to rely indirectly on the mutable/immutable distinction when deciding the religion cases under Title VII. While § 701(j) collapsed the conduct/status distinction, religion is nonetheless often treated in a similar manner to the other protected traits, with courts requiring little more than -neutral‖ treatment of religious employees. 16 Courts have done so, in large part, by assuming that religion is nothing more than a matter of personal preference or a lifestyle choice. This illustrates how deeply ingrained the mutable/immutable distinction is in judicial reasoning.
Part II of this article examines whether religion, and specifically religious conduct, should be considered a mutable or immutable trait. This Part concludes that there is a striking lack of consensus on whether religious conduct is mutable or immutable.
Part III focuses on the legislative history of § 701(j) which clearly illustrates that Congress intended for religious conduct, as well as for religious status (belief), to be protected under Title VII. This Part will also examine how, despite this legislative history, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted § 701(j).
Part IV examines how many lower courts have implicitly relied on the mutable/immutable distinction in a manner that has limited an employee's right to religious accommodation in the workplace. First, this Part will examine how the courts have relied on the concept of -choice‖ to limit an employee's right to religious accommodation in the workplace. Second, this Part will focus on the fact that judges are particularly skeptical of an employee's request for religious accommodation in cases where the employee does not follow all or mainstream church dogma or changes his or her level of religious observance. Finally, this Part will examine cases where courts have determined that an accommodation is reasonable even if the religious conflict is not eliminated. 16 There are, of course, some religious accommodation cases where the religious plaintiff does win and courts do mandate accommodation of a religious belief or practice. The mutable/immutable distinction is well-established under Title VII, and plaintiffs regularly lose in cases where an employer's dress or grooming codes are challenged under Title VII's prohibition on race or sex discrimination since dress and grooming are considered mutable characteristics that an employee can easily change. Religion is somewhat unique since there is a significant lack of consensus as to whether religion is a mutable or immutable trait.
17
This lack of consensus as to whether religion is mutable, is clearly more of an issue regarding religious conduct than religious status (or belief). Since Title VII, at a minimum, mandates neutral treatment based on protected categories, religious status is clearly entitled to Title VII protection whether volitional or not. However, there is disagreement on the extent to which religious conduct should be protected in the workplace and the mutable/immutable distinction has been used to limit an employee's right to affirmative accommodation of religious practices.
Some courts 18 and commentators 19 simply presume that religionboth belief and conduct -is a mutable characteristic. This presumption is often made with no discussion or justification. As will be explained in Part IV, courts often presume religion is mutable as a means of limiting an employee's right to religious accommodation in the workplace. However, many commentators who opine that religion is mutable also believe that it is a fundamental right that is worthy of protection. As a result, some commentators have argued that because religious conduct is entitled to Title VII protection under § 701(j), this should be used as a model for mandating accommodation of other, non-religious mutable traits under Title VII.
20
Other legal commentators do not agree that religious conduct is a mutable trait and simply a matter of -personal choice. to work on their Sabbath. 21 Justice O'Connor determined that the statute unconstitutionally favored Sabbatarians because it gave them -the right to select the day of the week in which to refrain from labor.‖ 22 Professor Carter quoted Michael McConnell to note that it -would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he has ‗selected the day of the week in which to refrain from labor,' since the Jewish people have been under the impression for some 3,000 years that this choice was made by God.‖ 23 Similarly, another commentator has argued that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, which has been introduced in Congress in an effort to strengthen an employee's right to accommodation of religious conduct in the workplace, presumes that religion is immutable. 24 Furthermore, many truly devout individuals do not believe that their religious conduct is simply a mutable characteristic.
While it is unclear if religion is a mutable or immutable trait, this should not be an issue for courts analyzing § 701(j) cases. As will be explained in the next Part, this is because § 701(j) specifically collapsed the conduct/status distinction and mandates accommodation of religious conduct as well as religious belief/status. Therefore even if courts presume that religion is mutable, this should not affect their analysis under 701(j).
III. OVERVIEW OF SECTION § 701(J)
The legislative history of § 701(j) illustrates that Congress intended that both religious conduct and religious status were to be protected and therefore courts should not analyze whether religion is a mutable or immutable characteristic. Title VII, as originally passed, did treat religion the same as race, color, sex, or national origin and prohibited discrimination based on religious beliefs or status but contained no language specifically requiring accommodation of religious conduct. 
A. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION PRIOR TO 1972
When the EEOC first interpreted Title VII to address the issue of reasonable accommodation of religion in its 1966 Guidelines, it emphasized the concept of neutrality but also stated that accommodation of the reasonable religious needs of employees should be made -where such accommodation can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.‖ 26 The following year, however, in 1967, the Commission essentially reversed itself and amended its Guidelines to require affirmative accommodation except in cases where -undue hardship,‖ would result.
27
Most courts chose not to follow the 1967 EEOC Guidelines. Two decisions in particular led to the eventual enactment of § 701(j) in 1972. In 1971, in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 28 the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's determination that failure to accommodate a Sabbatarian -who refused to work on Sundays -was not religious discrimination. The same year, a district court in Riley v. Bendix Corp. 29 followed Dewey's reasoning in determining that failure to accommodate a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, who also refused to work on his Sabbath, was not religious discrimination. Both the Dewey and Riley courts emphasized the concept of neutrality and focused on the fact that the plaintiffs were not discriminated against based on their religious beliefs or status.
B. CONGRESS ENACTS § 701(J)
In 1972, in response to the refusal of the courts to follow the 1967 EEOC Guidelines, Congress enacted § 701(j), which tracks the language of the 1967 Guidelines and states, -[t]he term ‗religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.‖ 34 In other words, regardless of whether religious conduct was mutable or immutable, it was entitled to legal protection.
C. THE SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS § 701(J)
The United States Supreme Court has twice interpreted § 701(j) and both times has narrowly defined an employer's obligation to accommodate an employee's religious conduct. 35 For purposes of examining how the courts have used the concept of -choice‖ -or the presumption that religion is a mutable characteristic and therefore not worthy of protection -Ansonia is the more important case. 84 . This case also addressed the deference that should be given to a seniority provision of a collective bargaining agreement prohibiting a religious employee from receiving time off for religious observance. This aspect of the case is beyond the scope of this article.
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Trans World Airlines (-TWA‖) for refusing to work on his Sabbath.
37
TWA rejected Hardison's proposal that he work a four-day week.
38
Hardison refused to work on his Sabbath and was ultimately discharged on grounds of insubordination.
39
According to the Court, allowing Hardison to work a four-day week and replacing him on his Sabbath with either supervisory personnel or employees from other departments would lead to lost efficiency and therefore constitute more than a de minimis cost. 40 Similarly, replacing Hardison with another employee not scheduled to work and then paying premium wages to this employee would require higher costs to TWA and thereby constitute more than a de minimis cost. 41 Commentators, 42 as well as the Hardison dissent, 43 have criticized the Court equating undue hardship with any cost greater than de minimis, and some lower courts in reality have required employers to incur more than a de minimis cost in accommodating religious employees. 44 In addressing the definition of -undue hardship,‖ the Hardison Court did not discuss the concept of choice and whether religion is a mutable or immutable characteristic. Rather, regardless of whether religious conduct is mutable or immutable, the Court determined that an employer need not incur more than a de minimis cost in accommodating a religious employee. accommodation. 45 The Commission broadly interpreted the definition of religious practices -to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious beliefs.‖ 46 The Guidelines further state that -[t]he fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee.‖
The EEOC's Response to
47
The Guidelines also tightened the undue hardship standard, determining that undue hardship would only be found in cases where an employer could demonstrate an actual hardship and would not be found in cases where there was merely an anticipated or hypothetical hardship. 48 In addition, the EEOC suggested a number of possible accommodations, including the use of voluntary substitutes, the implementation of flexible work schedules, and, if such accommodations were not possible, then the use of a lateral transfer. 49 The Commission specifically determined that in some cases an employer would be required to absorb an economic cost in accommodating a religious employee. 50 Additionally, the Commission determined that -when there is more than one means of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the employer or labor organization must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities.‖ 51 In other words, an employee is entitled to his preferred accommodation so long as it does not cause undue hardship.
Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook
Six years after the EEOC issued its 1980 Guidelines, the Supreme Court again narrowly interpreted § 701(j) in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook. 52 This case is best known for holding that -where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee's alternative accommodations 45 
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Religious Conduct 463 would result in undue hardship.‖ 53 In so ruling, the Court chose to disregard the EEOC's 1980 Guidelines which determined that an employer must accept the employee's preferred accommodation so long as it does not cause undue hardship.
Ronald Philbrook was a high school teacher and a member of the Worldwide Church of God, whose religious beliefs required that he be absent from school to celebrate approximately six religious holidays each year. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in place, Philbrook was entitled to only three paid days off for religious reasons and was permitted to take the additional days off without pay.
54
In holding for the Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that unpaid leave in general would be a reasonable accommodation since an employee would merely be giving up pay for a day that he did not work.
55
In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall stated that the case should be remanded for -factual findings on both the intended scope of the school board's leave provision and the reasonableness and expected hardship of Philbrook's proposals.‖ 56 Justice Marshall was not convinced that Philbrook had been reasonably accommodated and explained that his conflict was not fully resolved since he would still be forced to give up pay in order to follow his religious beliefs. The Ansonia Court did not explicitly address whether religion, and specifically religious conduct, was a mutable or immutable characteristic. In interpreting § 701(j), the Ansonia Court held that a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation that -eliminates the conflict between [the employee's] employment requirements and 53 Id. at 68. 54 Id. at 63-64. 55 Id. at 70-71. 56 Id. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 57 Id. at 74.
464
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Despite this rhetoric, the Court also held that the accommodation at issue, which did not completely eliminate Ansonia's religious conflict, was still reasonable. However, it should be noted that in Ansonia, the religious employee was not required to compromise on his religious beliefs. Rather, the compromise he was required to make was purely secular -lost pay. However, as will be explained in Part IV below, the reasoning of Ansonia has been extended by the lower courts, and some courts have determined that religious employees can be required to compromise their religious beliefs. While these courts do not explicitly state that religion is a mutable characteristic, once a court holds that an accommodation is reasonable even if it requires an employee to compromise on his religious beliefs, that court is in fact stating that religion is a mutable characteristic that an individual can choose to follow or dismiss at will.
Therefore, despite a Congressional determination that an employee's religious beliefs should be accommodated in the workplace, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted an employer's obligation under § 701(j) in a manner that is at odds with Congressional intent. In so doing, the Court has ignored both the EEOC guidelines and the legislative history of § 701(j). Since § 701(j) collapsed the conduct/status distinction, -choice‖ should not be an issue in these cases. However, as will be explained in the following Part, this issue of -choice‖ has continued to resurface.
IV. CASES WHERE THE LOWER COURTS HAVE RELIED ON THE CONCEPT OF CHOICE
Since § 701(j) collapsed the status/conduct distinction, courts do not directly state that religious conduct is a matter of personal choice and therefore not protected by Title VII. Rather, once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the courts do need to consider whether the religious employee has been reasonably accommodated. 60 59 Id. at 70. 60 The courts use a two-part procedure when analyzing claims under 701(j). First, a plaintiff must meet a three-part test to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination. -The employee must establish that (1) he bad a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) he informed the employer of the belief and conflict and (3) the employer threatened him or subjected him to discriminatory treatment . 
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In one of the most comprehensive law review articles published on § 701(j), Professor Engle opines that -courts seem to have successfully avoided the question of whether religion is immutable.‖ 61 While the author agrees that courts do not explicitly rely on the issue of -choice‖ and the mutable/immutable distinction as they do in the other Title VII cases, courts do imply that religious conduct is a matter of personal choice and therefore mutable. There are three types of cases where this is most likely to arise.
First, courts have relied on the concept of -choice‖ in cases addressing whether an employee's obligation to cooperate with his employer includes an obligation to compromise on his religious beliefs. When courts determine that an employee must compromise on his religious beliefs, these courts are implicitly stating that religion is simply a matter of choice or a mutable trait since it is not possible to compromise on an immutable trait.
Second, courts are more likely to focus on -choice‖ in cases where religious employees do not consistently follow a traditional religious dogma. This includes 1) cases where the employee does not follow all the rules of an established institutional religion; 2) cases where the employee is not a member of a mainstream institutional religion; and 3) cases where the employee changes his or her level of religious observance. Third, courts have relied on the concept of -choice‖ in cases addressing whether an accommodation can be reasonable if it does not eliminate the employee's religious conflict.
These cases illustrate both the importance of the mutable/immutable distinction in judicial reasoning and also illustrate the courts' skepticism of religion. This Part will examine these three categories of cases.
A. THE DUTY TO COOPERATE AND THE DUTY TO COMPROMISE
One way which courts have relied on the concept of choice is by using rhetoric implying employees have an obligation to compromise on their religious beliefs. While courts do not explicitly use the mutable/immutable distinction, this court-imposed requirement of employee compromise clearly implies that religion is a mutable characteristic that an individual can choose to follow or dismiss at will. Once a court has defined religion as a matter of personal choice, it is established a prima facie case of religious discrimination -the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence showing that it cannot reasonably accommodate the worker without incurring undue hardship.‖ See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996). 61 Engel, supra note 2, at 323.
466
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law
[Vol. 17.3 much easier for the court to determine that accommodation of the religious employee should not be required. Often, this duty to compromise stems from an employee's court-imposed obligation to cooperate with his employer.
When Cooperation Mandates Compromise
The courts agree that a religious employee has a duty to cooperate with his employer in securing an accommodation for his religious needs.
62 While this obligation of cooperation requires an employee to work with his employer in securing an obligation, cooperation alone does not imply that religion is an alterable characteristic. The duty of employee cooperation was acknowledged in Ansonia when the Court stated that:
Senator Randolph, the sponsor of the amendment that became § 701(j), expressed his hope that accommodation would be made with -flexibility‖ and -a desire to achieve an adjustment.‖ Consistent with these goals, courts have noted that -bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's business.‖ 63 Employees, therefore, regularly lose when they fail to make use of means provided by the employer which could have resolved their conflict. 64 For example, EEOC v. Autonation USA Corporation, involved a plaintiff who was a devout Christian and a Sabbatarian. The employer suggested a number of possible accommodations so that the plaintiff would not need to work on his Sabbath, but the plaintiff resigned on the first day of discussions regarding possible accommodations without giving the employer an opportunity to implement or test the various accommodations. The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's -resignation while discussions regarding potential accommodations were ongoing and in their early stages violated his correlative duty to make a good faith effort to satisfy his needs.‖ Spring 2010]
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Courts also agree that employees can be required to make some secular compromises in having their religious observances accommodated, but there is not a clear consensus as to the secular cost employees can be required to bear. In Ansonia, the Court held that the accommodation at issue, time off without pay, was reasonable even though it did not completely eliminate Ansonia's conflict. Similarly, in ruling that an employer did not discriminate against an employee who was also a minister by refusing to give him a busy Saturday off to officiate at a funeral, the Fifth Circuit implied that an employee does have an obligation to reschedule. The court stated that -[a]lthough plaintiff's religion would have permitted a substitute minister to officiate at the funeral, he [plaintiff] made no effort to obtain one. Likewise, no effort was made to change the time of the funeral.‖
66
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit implied that the duty to cooperate does not necessarily include a duty to reschedule since -[a]n inflexible duty to reschedule would impose too great a burden on employees who desire to attend religious ceremonies for which they might not be able to change the date or time, such as baptisms, confirmations, or weddings.‖
67
The federal courts do not agree how far this duty of cooperation extends and some courts have used rhetoric implying that employees have a duty to compromise their religious beliefs. This compromise rhetoric clearly implies that religion is a mutable characteristic and simply a matter of personal choice.
For example, in Chrysler v. Mann, 68 the Eighth Circuit held for the defendant-employer after determining that the plaintiff had failed -to consider any sort of a compromise insofar as his religion was concerned,‖ 69 or to -try to accommodate his own religious beliefs.‖
70
While Chrysler has also been read as merely requiring an employee to cooperate with his employer, 71 the language the court used does imply that an employee also has a duty to compromise his religious beliefs. In other words, religion is a mutable characteristic that employees can choose to follow or dismiss at will. 72 The Redmond Court did acknowledge that Chrysler could also be read as requiring an employee to compromise his religious beliefs since it stated -to the extent that the Chrysler court may be interpreted to say that it is incumbent on plaintiff to show first that he has made some effort to either ‗compromise' or accommodate his own religious beliefs before he can seek an accommodation form his employer, we disagree.‖ Id. at 901-02. 75 The plaintiff in this case, for religious reasons, prefaced almost all of her sentences with the phrase -In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth.‖ 76 The court could have found for the employer based solely on -undue hardship‖ since accommodating the religious employee would cause undue hardship to the employer who did not want to offend the religious beliefs of its customers. However, the Johnson court did not simply rely on -undue hardship‖ but also used rhetoric implying the employee had an obligation to compromise on his beliefs stating that the employee -did not make any effort . . . to accommodate her beliefs to the legitimate and reasonable interests of her employer . . . .‖ 77 In other words, the employee's religious conduct was mutable or a matter of personal choice.
In Daniels v. City of Arlington, Texas,
78 the Fifth Circuit also used rhetoric implying that an employee had an obligation to compromise his religious beliefs. The plaintiff in this case was a police officer who during the course of his employment began to wear a small gold cross pin on his shirt as a symbol of his evangelical Christianity. This violated the police department's policy which prohibited officers from wearing buttons, badges or medals on their uniform shirts. While the Fifth Circuit held for the employer and determined that permitting Daniels to wear the cross pin would be an -undue hardship,‖ the court also used rhetoric implying that religion is a mutable characteristic that an employee can choose to follow or dismiss at will. For example, the court specifically determined that the plaintiff's religious conduct -his request to wear the pin -was -unreasonable. 82 a federal district court failed to adequately distinguish between an employee's duty to cooperate and an employee's duty to compromise and accepted the defendant's use of those terms interchangeably. The plaintiff, an evangelical Christian who wore the message -Jesus is Lord‖ on a badge on his vest, was hired as a courier and was fired when he refused to remove the badge. According to the supervisor, -[t]he fact he was persistent, and didn't want to compromise in any way, he left me with no choice [but] to terminate him.‖ 83 However, the court did find that the plaintiff had established a prima case of religious discrimination and refused to grant summary judgment for the employer based on the fact it was unclear what accommodation, if any, had been offered to the plaintiff. 84 Other courts examining the issue have ruled that an employee's duty to cooperate does not include compromising on his or her religious beliefs. 85 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital is often quoted for its holding that -bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's business.‖ 86 However, the Brener court also stated that, -[o]f course, an employee is not required to modify his religious beliefs . . . only to attempt to satisfy them within procedures offered by the employer.‖ 87 The Seventh Circuit agrees that an employee's obligation is to work with the employer and not to compromise his religious beliefs.
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The Sabbatarian Cases
The duty of cooperation and the duty of compromise has also been an issue in cases where an employee had to refrain from work on his Sabbath. There are cases from both the Fourth and Sixth Circuitswhich have been overruled or simply not followed in subsequent decisions -that required Sabbatarians to compromise these beliefs. 89 While these cases are no longer good law, they illustrate how courts have implicitly determined that religion is simply a matter of personal choice. Professor Carter describes this attitude as -if you must observe your Sabbath, have the good sense to understand that it is just like any other day off from work.‖ 90 Discussing a Seventh Day Adventist who was a Sabbatarian, the Fourth Circuit stated in Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank that -[the plaintiff's] pre-requirement on its face was so unlimited and absolute in scope-never to work on Saturday-that it speaks its own unreasonableness and [is] thus beyond accommodation.‖ 91 However, as the dissent in the case correctly explained, plaintiff's refusal to work on her Sabbath -is the beginning of the case, not the solution. It is the premise which invokes the Act and the regulation, for lacking one who has religious beliefs of the unbending nature of those held by plaintiff, neither Congress nor the Commission would have occasion to say that an employer has the duty to accommodate . . . .‖ 92 Before eventually overruling Jordan, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit again reasoned that an employer was under no obligation to accommodate a Sabbatarian, since the request was simply too extreme and beyond accommodation. 93 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that the employee had -refused to compromise in any way on the Sunday work issue.‖ 94 In other words, religion was a mutable characteristic and a matter of personal choice on which an employee should compromise. Ithaca was, however, overturned by the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc, which explained that the district court's reasoning -turns the statute on
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95
The reasoning of the Jordan court was also relied upon in an unpublished Sixth Circuit decision, Settles v. Wickes Lumber Division, which held that -[a] ppellant's ultimatum that he would never work on Saturdays may well constitute the type of blanket demand that cannot reasonably be accommodated.‖ 96 This ruling is particularly disturbing given that the court could have simply held for the employer on the grounds that accommodation would have caused undue hardship since employer was in mass retailing and he required all salesmen to work on Saturday, which was his busiest day. 97 While the court did not explicitly state that religion was a mutable characteristic, the court implicitly relied on this reasoning because it took pains to emphasize that the employee should change his unreasonable conduct of being a Sabbatarian. Again, it is only mutable characteristics that can be changed. Subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions have not relied on the reasoning of the Jordan court and have instead required accommodation of Sabbatarians absent a showing of undue hardship.
98
B. WHEN RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEES DO NOT FOLLOW ALL OR MAINSTREAM CHURCH DOGMA OR CHANGE THEIR LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE
The courts are more likely to focus on -choice‖ in cases where religious employees do not consistently follow a majority institutional religion. There are three overlapping categories of cases where this occurs. First, the -choice‖ issue arises in cases where an employee does not follow a traditional institutional majority religion. Second, -choice‖ is an issue in cases where an employee follows some but not all church dogma. Third, this is an issue in cases where an employee becomes more observant over the course of his or her employment and requests additional accommodations. In all these cases, courts have used rhetoric implying that religion is simply a mutable characteristic that an employee can chose to follow or dismiss at will. 95 
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Cases Where Religious Employees Do Not Follow a Mainstream Church Dogma
Courts tend to be skeptical of employees' religious beliefs in cases where these beliefs do not stem from a majority religion. In these cases, courts are more likely to determine that the requested accommodation is really an issue of personal choice or a mutable characteristic. After the enactment of § 701(j), courts struggled for years with how to define -religious‖ and specifically which religious conduct should be protected by Title VII. 99 Between 1972 and 1980, courts determined that religious observances that were mandated by an institutional religion were protected, while those that were not mandated by an institutional religion were a matter of personal choice and were not protected.
100
In 1980, however, the EEOC issued its -Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion‖ (-Guidelines‖). 101 The Commission broadly interpreted the definition of religious practices -to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious beliefs.‖ 102 The Guidelines further stated that -[t]he fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee.‖ 103 Courts therefore no longer explicitly state that religious conduct is only protected if it is mandated by an institutional religion.
Yet despite these Guidelines, the courts tend to be skeptical of employees who do not follow mainstream institutional church dogma and seem very uncomfortable with how broadly religion has been defined. 104 As a result of this skepticism, courts are more likely to rely on 99 In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corporation 105 a federal district court granted summary judgment for the employer after expressing skepticism regarding the plaintiff's request for religious accommodation. The plaintiff, a member of the Church of Body Modification, claimed that she had a religious need to wear and display facial piercings at all times, which violated Costco's dress code. 106 The court determined that Costco's proposed accommodations -permitting the plaintiff to either cover her facial piercings with a band-aid or to wear a retainer -were reasonable and that any additional accommodation would have caused Costco -undue hardship.‖ 107 The plaintiff had refused both of these accommodations stating that her religious beliefs required her to display the facial jewelry at all times.
108
In holding for Costco, the court did not explicitly question the sincerity of the plaintiff's religious beliefs. In fact the court emphasized that at the summary judgment stage it is generally very difficult for a defendant to -challenge the contention that the plaintiff's belief is religious, no matter now unconventional the asserted religious beliefs may be.‖
109
Yet despite this holding, the court expressed great skepticism regarding the plaintiff's religious beliefs, stating that even if it accepted that CBM was a bona fide religion, the plaintiff's requirement that she display her facial piercings -represents the plaintiff's personal interpretation of the stringency of her beliefs.‖ 110 The court concluded that -[a]ll of these facts strongly suggest that while Cloutier may have a strong personal preference to display her facial piercings at all timesher preference does not constitute a strongly held religious belief.‖ 
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In other words, while the district court explicitly stated that it was not questioning whether the plaintiff had a sincerely held religious belief, it nonetheless determined that the plaintiff's religion was little more than a personal lifestyle choice which by definition is mutable.
In Endres v. Indiana State Police,
112 the Seventh Circuit focused on the concept of -choice‖ in upholding a Baptist Police Officer's termination for refusing to work at a casino. The officer believed that gambling was sinful and that he must therefore neither gamble nor help others to gamble. 113 In ruling in the employer's favor, the court held that it was unreasonable for a police department to -accommodate taskspecific conscientious objection without undue hardship . . . and § 701(j) calls only for reasonable accommodation.‖ 114 However, throughout its opinion the court used the rhetoric of -choice.‖ According to the court, the plaintiff -contends that § 701(j) gives law enforcement personnel a right to choose which laws they will enforce.‖ 115 The Seventh Circuit further explained that the plaintiff -wants to be an agent and to choose his assignments too,‖ 116 and that it is -difficult for any organization to accommodate employees who are choosy about [their] assignments.‖ 117 Furthermore, the court determined that it is problematic if the -public knows that its protectors have a private agenda.‖ 118 In other words the plaintiff's request for religious accommodation was really a matter of personal choice that he could choose to follow or dismiss at will.
The dissent fundamentally disagreed with the majority's reasoning and expressed specific concern with the opinion's impact on -members of minority religions, whose doctrines are not well-understood or appreciated in our culture.‖ of an aborted fetus. 121 Other employees were upset by the button and complained of harassment with some refusing to go to meetings that the plaintiff attended. As a result a forty percent decline in productivity occurred. 122 The plaintiff refused to take off the button and was eventually fired.
123
The Eighth Circuit determined that the employer had reasonably accommodated Wilson by permitting her to wear the button, so long as she kept it covered. 124 This accommodation eludes common sense, since wearing a covered button is an ineffective way of expressing an opinion.
The court also made it clear that Wilson should have chosen another means of expressing her religious views. The court emphasized that it was only Wilson's button, and not her views on abortion that were objectionable, and that many employees who opposed her button actually shared her views on abortion. 125 The court noted that the employer did not object to other religious articles in Wilson's cubicle or another employee's anti-abortion button. 126 The Eighth Circuit even emphasized that Wilson's supervisors, who did not allow her to wear the button uncovered, were also Roman Catholics who opposed abortion and thus represented a -normal‖ comparison group of Roman Catholics. 127 In other words, Wilson should have and could have, chosen a different and more normal means of expressing her religious views. This reliance on choice presumes that religion is mutable.
In Johnson v. Halls Manufacturing,
128 a federal district court ruled in favor of an employer who owned a retail business and refused to accommodate an employee's request to begin almost every sentence with the phrase, -In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth.‖ 129 Relying on the rhetoric of choice, the court held that the plaintiff -did not make any effort . . . to accommodate her beliefs to the legitimate and reasonable interests of her employer.‖ 130 Again, when dealing with a request for accommodation of a minority religious belief, the court relied on the concept of choice and clearly implied that the religious conduct in question was mutable. Courts are also, understandably, unsympathetic to employees who claim that their white supremacist, racist and anti-Semitic beliefs are religious beliefs. These cases differ from the other cases discussed in this Part involving minority religions since they involve belief systems associated with hatred, physical violence and abuse. Some courts have directly held that the Ku Klux Klan 131 or United Klans of America 132 are not religious organizations but rather are political organizations. Another district court held that even if the Ku Klux Klan were a religion, an employee who was a member of the Klan was reasonably accommodated when he was required to cover up a tattoo on his arm of a hooded figure in front of a burning cross at all times except when washing his hands since his tattoo was -racist and violent.‖ 
Cases Where Religious Employees Do Not Follow All Church Dogma
Courts are also skeptical of an employee's request for religious accommodation if the employee does not follow all church dogma. In these cases the courts are more likely to find that the employee does not have a -sincerely held religious belief‖ and that the religious practice in question is simply a mutable characteristic or a matter of personal choice. It may seem understandable that courts are more skeptical of an employee who only follows some church dogma since it appears that the employee is -choosing‖ which practices to follow. However this all or nothing approach ignores the reality that many truly religious individuals do not follow every tenet of their religion and may sincerely belief in some, but not all, of the tenets of their religion. For example, in EEOC v. Union Independiente, 134 the First Circuit held that the district court had erroneously granted summary judgment in determining that the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, had a sincerely held religious belief that prohibited him from joining a union. In reaching this conclusion the First Circuit relied on the fact that the plaintiff had engaged in some conduct contrary to his Church's teachingsspecifically, he was divorced, took an oath before a notary and had lied on an employment application. 135 In other words, the court determined that because the employee did not consistently follow every rule of his religion, none of his religious beliefs were sincerely held. Spring 2010]
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Circuit clearly implied that the plaintiff was -choosing‖ which tenets of the religion to follow and therefore his religious conduct was mutable.
In EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, 136 the Seventh Circuit did determine that an employee had a sincerely held belief that she could not work on Yom Kippur (the most important Jewish high holiday) even though she was not an observant Jew. However, the court seemed very uncomfortable with its own holding and took pains to emphasize that the employee had a sincerely held religious belief to refrain from work on Yom Kippur since she had become more observant as a result of deaths in the family and the birth of her son. 137 In other words, the court had a need to justify why the employee, who did not consistently follow all religious rules, should still have a particular religious belief accommodated.
Similarly, in EEOC v. Chemisco, Inc., 138 a federal district court denied an employer's motion for summary judgment and held that the plaintiff, a member of the World Wide Church of God, could have a sincerely held religious belief that working on the Sabbath was a sin, even if she did not follow all church doctrine. The court took pains to emphasize the sincerity of the plaintiff's belief, stating that the -record indicates that Ms. Brown has never worked on a Saturday at any job.‖
139
In other words, the plaintiff was not merely -choosing‖ which tenets to follow, which would imply mutability, but rather had a well-established, sincerely held religious belief that she could not work on her Sabbath.
When Religious Beliefs Change Over Time
Courts are also skeptical of an employee's request for religious accommodation and rely on the concept of choice and the mutable/immutable distinction in cases where an employee's religious beliefs change over time and the employee becomes more religious. Again, this to some extent is understandable. If an employee himself has changed his religious conduct, it may appear to be a mutable characteristic and a matter of choice. However, this again ignores the reality that many religious individual's beliefs do evolve over time and an employee's beliefs can both evolve and also be -sincerely held.‖ It also ignores the EEOC's approach that sincerely held religious beliefs 136 In EEOC v. Union Independiente, 141 the First Circuit based its holding, in part, on the fact that the employee had initially been willing to join a union. 142 While the court did not explicitly rely on the mutable/immutable distinction, the court relied, in part, on the fact that the employee's religious beliefs had changed over time. It is noteworthy that despite its holding the court did acknowledge that a sincerely held religious belief may change over time and the plaintiff's refusal to join a union -might simply reflect an evolution in [his] views to more steadfast opposition to union membership.‖ 143 While there are courts that have recognized that an employee's religious beliefs can both evolve over time and still be sincerely held and entitled to accommodation, this is not a decision that courts make lightly. For example, in EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, 144 the court determined that an employee did have a sincerely held religious belief that she should not work on Yom Kippur (a Jewish high holiday) despite the fact that this belief had developed over the course of her employment. As explained above, the court emphasized that the employee's -religion had become increasingly important in recent years‖ as a result of deaths in her family and the birth of a child. 145 Similarly, in Baker v. Home Depot, 146 the Second Circuit refused to grant summary judgment for an employer in a case where the plaintiff had become a strict Sabbatarian over the course of his employment. 147 Again, the court did not make this decision lightly but rather took pains to emphasize that the employee's religious beliefs were sincerely held even though they had evolved over time.
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As this Part has explained, courts are more likely to focus on -choice‖ in cases where the religious employee does not consistently follow a majority institutional religion. The next Part will focus on cases that have held that accommodations can be reasonable even if the religious conflict is not eliminated.
C. WHEN COURTS FIND THAT ACCOMMODATIONS ARE REASONABLE EVEN IF THE CONFLICT IS NOT ELIMINATED
There is some conflict among the circuits as to whether an accommodation can be reasonable if the employee's conflict between his work and religious practice is not eliminated. In interpreting § 701(j), the Ansonia Court held that a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation that -eliminates the conflict between [the employee's] employment requirements and religious practices.‖ 148 Courts therefore usually find that accommodations which cannot possibly remove the employee's conflict are not reasonable. 149 However, the lower courts are split on whether an accommodation with the potential to eliminate the employee's conflict, such as a voluntary shift swap, can be a reasonable accommodation even in cases where the accommodation in fact does not eliminate the conflict. It is striking that there are many courts that find an accommodation is reasonable even if it does not eliminate the religious employee's conflict. In making this determination, these courts are essentially stating that it is reasonable to require a religious employee to alter or compromise on his religious conduct, which is only possible if religious conduct is mutable. Therefore, in holding that employees who have to alter their religious conduct have been -reasonably accommodated,‖ courts clearly imply that religious conduct is mutable. 148 Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986) . 149 See, e.g., Ilona of Hungary, 97 F.3d at 211 (holding that a Jewish employee who requested a day off from work for Yom Kippur -a Jewish High Holidaywas not reasonably accommodated when her employer permitted her to take off another day instead); Pedersen v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 978 F. Supp. 926 (D. Neb. 1997) (referencing the jury's finding that an employee who requested Easter off for religious observance was not reasonably accommodated when she was only given part of the day off); Graves v. Nordstrom, No. C-94-20457 RMW, 1994 WL 721589 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1994) (holding that a Sabbatarian who requested his Sabbath off was not reasonably accommodated when he was given a long break but required to work part of his Sabbath). But see Sturgill v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2008) (declining to hold that a reasonable accommodation must eliminate any religion-work conflict and concluding -that the district court erred in instructing the jury that a reasonable accommodation must eliminate the religious conflict‖).
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have determined that the use of a rotating shift system, particularly if combined with a system permitting voluntary shift swaps, can be a reasonable accommodation even if the religious conflict is not eliminated.
159
However, some of the lower courts seem comfortable holding that an accommodation can be reasonable even if it does not eliminate the religious employee's conflict and emphasize that accommodation was not possible because the religious employee failed to fully cooperate with his employer. Courts are particularly likely to rely on this lack of employee cooperation in cases where the employer permits the religious employee to engage in voluntary shift swaps and the religious employee fails to make full use of the shift swapping system. 160 However, some courts have blamed the religious employee for failure to cooperate with the employer even in cases where there was no employee willing to swap shifts with the religious employee, 161 had determined that a religious employee who needed approximately six days off to celebrate his religious holidays was reasonably accommodated when he was given three days off with pay and was permitted to take the additional days off without pay. 163 In holding for the employer, the Supreme Court said that unpaid leave in general would be a reasonable accommodation since an employee would merely be giving up pay for a day that he did not work. 164 Relying on the reasoning of Ansonia, the Fifth Circuit in EEOC v. Universal Manufacturing determined that -absolute accommodation‖ is not necessary. 165 Similarly relying on Ansonia, the Fourth Circuit has held that an employer is -not required to provide absolute accommodation, only a ‗reasonable accommodation.'‖ 166 Federal district courts have also determined that the accommodation does not need to be absolute or the best accommodation possible, 167 and does not need to -totally eliminate the conflict.‖ 168 In these cases the lower courts found that an accommodation could be reasonable even if it required an employee to violate his religious tenets.
However, these courts are misreading the holding of Ansonia. As explained in Part II, the compromise the employee was required to make in Ansonia involved lost pay for days not worked which was a secular compromise and the Ansonia Court did not state that an employee should be required to alter his religious beliefs or conduct. In interpreting § 701(j), the Ansonia Court explicitly stated that a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation that -eliminates the conflict between [the employee's] employment requirements and religious practices.‖ 169 However, these lower courts do not distinguish between compromises of a secular nature and compromises of one's religious beliefs. Rather these courts essentially state that it is -reasonable‖ to expect a religious individual to alter his religious conduct, which implies religion is mutable since immutable traits by definition are not alterable.
Courts that Have Determined the Religious Conflict Must be Eliminated
There are some courts that have explicitly determined an accommodation is only reasonable if the employee's religious conflict is eliminated. As explained above, 170 these courts are in the minority. The EEOC has also taken the approach that a -reasonable accommodation must eliminate the conflict between work and religion unless such accommodation would impose an undue hardship.‖ 171 For example, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation that eliminates the conflict with the employee's religious conduct. 172 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly distinguished between compromises of a secular nature and compromises of a religious nature. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the religious conflict may be eliminated through an accommodation, such as transfer to a different position, which will place the religious employee in a -less attractive employment status.‖
173
Depending on the change in employment status, this type of accommodation might be reasonable. However, the Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that these cases are -distinct‖ from cases where the religious conflict is not eliminated. 174 In making this distinction the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly relied on the mutable/immutable 170 See supra Part IV.C.1. 171 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 62, at 52 n.130. The EEOC Guidelines -as well as some of the cases discussed in this part -do not distinguish between accommodations that have the potential to eliminate the religion-work conflict, such as voluntary shift swaps, and accommodations that cannot possibly eliminate the conflict. Rather these decisions and the Guidelines simply state that a reasonable accommodation must eliminate the conflict. 172 Am. Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding district court failed to consider whether transferring postal clerks to another position preserved their employment status after determining that transfer would eliminate the religious conflict faced by the clerks); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding employee who was atheist could not be required to attend devotional services at the Christian faith operated business where he worked and must have his religious objection to attending such services fully accommodated). 173 Am. Postal Workers, 781 F.2d at 776. The Court further explained, -Where an employer proposes an accommodation which effectively eliminates the religious conflict faced by a particular employee, however, the inquiry under Title VII reduces to whether the accommodation reasonably preserves the affected employee's employment status.‖ Id. 174 Id.
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[Vol. 17.3 distinction. However, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning presumes that it is not reasonable to expect a religious employee to alter his beliefs or conduct. The Second 175 and Seventh Circuits 176 have also explicitly stated that a reasonable accommodation must -eliminate‖ the religious conflict.
There are also district courts that have held a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation that eliminates the religious conflict.
177 Additionally, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) would amend § 701(j) to state that a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation that removes the conflict between the religious practice and the work requirement. 178 
D. SUMMARY OF CASES WHERE LOWER COURTS HAVE RELIED ON THE CONCEPT OF CHOICE
Despite giving lip service to §701(j), there are three types of cases where courts are most likely to imply that religious conduct is a matter of personal choice or a mutable characteristic that is not entitled to accommodation. First, courts have relied on the concept of -choice‖ in cases addressing whether an employee's obligation to cooperate with his employer includes an obligation to compromise on his religious beliefs. Second, courts are more likely to focus on -choice‖ in cases where religious employees do not consistently follow a traditional religious dogma. Third, courts have relied on the concept of -choice‖ in cases addressing whether an accommodation can be reasonable if it does not eliminate the employee's religious conflict.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 701(j) collapsed the conduct/status distinction, and the federal courts therefore do not directly state that religious conduct is mutable and not entitled to Title VII protection. However, many courts continue to implicitly rely on the mutable/immutable distinction in a manner that limits an employee's right to religious accommodation in the workplace. Courts do so, in large part, by describing religious conduct as a matter of personal choice that an employee can chose to follow or dismiss at will. Once courts have described religion as being so adaptable or mutable, it becomes much easier to limit an employee's right to accommodation in the workplace.
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Courts often seem unaware of the fact that they are relying on the mutable/immutable distinction in the § 701(j) cases. Courts have implied that an employee's obligation to cooperate with his employer includes an obligation to compromise on his religious conduct without recognizing that an employee can only compromise if religion is mutable.
Courts are particularly likely to rely on the concept of choice in cases where they are skeptical of the employee's request for religious accommodation. This skepticism occurs in cases where an employee does not consistently follow a traditional religious dogma. Since religion is defined so broadly under § 701(j), courts often give lip service to the fact that an employee is engaging in -religious‖ conduct and then express skepticism about the employee's religious beliefs and deny the employee's right to accommodation in the workplace.
Similarly, many circuits have held an accommodation can be reasonable even if the religious conflict is not eliminated. In making this determination, these courts are essentially stating that it is reasonable to require a religious employee to alter or compromise his religious conduct, which is only possible if religious conduct is mutable. All of these cases, which ignore congressional intent in enacting 701(j), illustrate how deeply ingrained the mutable/immutable distinction is in judicial reasoning, and how difficult it is for courts to alter their thinking in the religion cases.
